

送電サレタ電報

國務省

ワシントン 一九四一年十一月二十四日

午後十一時

米國大使館

ロンドン（英）

五三九二

大統領ヨリ元海軍軍人宛秘密文書

十一月二十日 日本大使ハ暫定條約ノ申出ヲ我々ニ傳達シタ。

日本大使ハ新カ爾暫定條約ノ締結ハ太平洋地區ノ平和ニ關スル自由ニシテ廣汎ナ計畫ヲ支持スルヤウ日本國民ノ一般的感情ヲ發展サセル機會ヲ日本政府ニ與ヘ得ル事及ビ日本國內ノ政局ハコノ提案ニ示サレタルガ如キ或種ノ救援ヲ緊急ニ必要トスル程急迫シタモノデアル事ヲ述ベタノ提案ハ日本側ニ於テハ、日支間ノ平和回復或ハ日本ガ印廣支那ヨリ全兵力ヲ撤退スル場合ニ齎サレル太平洋地區ノ全般的確立迄現在

南部印度支那駐屯ノ日本軍全部ヲ北部印度支那へ移動スル旨ノ公約及
 ビ合衆國側ニ於テハ日本ニ石油ノ要求量ヲ供給シ又支那トノ平和回復
 ニ對スル日本ノ努力ニ不利益トナル手段ヲ差控ヘル旨ノ公約、並ビニ
 東南アジア及ビ南部太平洋地區へ提案ハ明ラカニ印度支那ヨリ支那へ
 ノ進駐ヲ除外セズ一ヘノ相互ニ武裝進駐ヲナサル事、南領印度支那
 ニ於テ日本國ノ要求スル物資獲得ニ協力スル事、及ビ商業上ノ關係
 テ凍結手段採用以前ノ狀態ニ回復スル旨ノ相互公約ヲナス事ヲ要求シ
 テキル。

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本政府ハ本政府ノ見解ニヨレバ日本ノ提案ハ一般的解決ノ基礎トシ
 テ提議セラレ兩國政府ガ承認シタ根本方針ニ相反スル點ヲ含ムデキル
 事ヲ日本政府ニ通知スル事ヲ提議スル。又平和目的ノ相互誓約ヲ含ム
 暫定條約ノ代案即東北亞細亞及ビ北部太平洋地區、東南亞細亞及ビ南
 部太平洋地區ヲ含ム地域ニ對シ武裝進駐ヲ行ハス旨ノ相互的約束、南
 部佛印ヨリ日本軍ヲ撤退サセル事ソレハ兵力ヲ補充セザル事、北部印
 度支那ノ兵力ヲ一九四一年七月二十六日ノ同地ニ於ケル兵數ニ制限シ

ソレヲ補充セザルコト、如何ナル場合ニモ二万五千テ越エズ、更ニ印
度支那ニ増兵テ行ハザル事等ヲ日本政府ニ提出スル事モ企圖サレテ来
ル。本政府ハソノ凍結令ノ緩和ニツイテ船舶用石炭、食料品及び或
ノ醫藥品、月額六十万弗迄ノ原料ノ棉花、民間人需要ノ毎月基本量ニ
ヨル一定量ノ石油等ノ程度ノ米穀ヨリ日本ヘノ輸出ヲ許可スルコトヲ
公約スルデアラウ、尤モコノヨリ輸出サル此ノ物品ノ量ハ英國及び
オランダ政府ノ協議ノ上決定セラルル事ヲ要スル

合衆國ハ日本ヨリノ輸入品ノウチ原料生糸ガ其ノ價格ノ三分ノ二ヲ得
ルストイフ條件付デ一般ニ輸入ヲ許可スルデアラウ。

新カル輸入ヨリ生タル收益ハ合衆國ヨリノ輸出品ノ購買及び合衆國內
ノ日本ノ債務ノ利息及び元金ノ支拂ノ爲ニ利用セラルデアラウ。

本政府ハ英國、オランダ、濠洲政府ニ對シ此ノ政府ガ同様ノ經濟手段
ヲ採用スル事ニツイテ交渉スルコトヲ約スデアラウ。

本暫定假條約ハ、ドテラカ一方ノ發意ニ依リ兩當事者ガ、太平洋地區
ノ平和的解決到達ノ見込ガコノ暫定條約ノ繼續ヲ必要トスルカ否カテ

決定スベク協議スルト云フ條件デ三ヶ月間有効ナル旨ノ規定ガ設ケ
ラレテアル。

(録音) 英國大使ハ之ガ報告ヲ受ケ貴國外務大臣ニ報告中
追 伸 (△)

署名 ルーズヴニルト
署名 ハ ル

ホワイトハウス

ワシントン
(△)

追 伸

コレハ日本人ニトツテ公正ナル提議ト思考サレルシカシ之ヲ承諾スル
カ拒否カハ實ニ日本國內政治ノ問題デアル。余ハ餘リ希望ヲ持ツテハ居
ナイ。我々ハ多分近イ將來ニ起ルベキ實際ノ困難ニ對シテ準備スルヲ要
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署名 ルーズヴニルト

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Exhibit #

3226

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, June 7, 1939.

No. 3936

SUBJECT: JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO THE
SITUATION IN EUROPE.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL: FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I had the honor in my telegram no. 245, May 26, 8 p.m.,
to present an analysis of certain trends in Japanese
thought with regard to foreign policy in relation to the
situation now developing in Europe. I observed that there

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were elements in Japan - not to be confused with certain congenial, but withal ineffectual, persons educated abroad who have been telling us that reaction to Japan's China policy was "just around the corner" - who realized that, in the event of a war in Europe, the maintenance by Japan of neutrality between the democratic and totalitarian camps would afford Japan little security, and that national security could be assured in the long run only by liquidating the conflict with China. I was not unaware of the need for resting an observation of this nature on a reasonably firm basis, and it is my purpose in this despatch to lay before the Department the circumstances, some of personal knowledge and the others which derive by deduction, on which my view was based. As there is no discussion in the press or in any other public forum of the question whether or not Japan should align itself with Germany and Italy - indeed, any reference by the press to this question is officially interdicted - information with regard to thought trends has come to me largely by word of mouth.

The first conversation which needs to be recorded took place on May 16, at a luncheon which was given in honor of the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew by a Japanese who, while holding no official position, is a close friend and confidant of high officials of the Court and of Prince Konoye, Minister

without Portfolio, and Marquis Kido, Minister of the Interior. He is in a position to exercise through various contacts considerable influence on the Government. As we left the table, our host drew the Ambassador and me into another room and talked substantially along the following lines:

Although the Japanese Government has decided not to conclude a military alliance with Germany and Italy, there was being exerted on the Government, not only by Germany and Italy but by reactionary groups in Japan, strong pressure toward entering into some arrangement with the latter countries which would reaffirm the solidarity among the nations whose policies were opposed by the democratic nations. The groups to which he belonged had succeeded in defeating the proposal to conclude the alliance and are now doing their best to defeat the "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact", or at least to prevent it from becoming a political link with Germany and Italy; but it was difficult to meet the argument of those who had advocated the alliance and are now favoring close association with Germany and Italy, that Japan cannot afford to be isolated. Germany and Italy are urging Japan "to come over to their side", while the democratic nations are turning to Japan a very cold shoulder. If, therefore, the democratic nations,

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especially the United States, could indicate to Japan that restoration of good relations with Japan is desired and that the way is open for Japan to align herself with the democratic nations, but not against the totalitarian states, those Japanese who are working for precisely those objectives would have their hand greatly strengthened.

The Ambassador said that he was very much interested in the views just expressed, but that it must be obvious that the restoration of peace and good relations between Japan and China must be a condition precedent to the restoration of good relations between Japan and the United States and other democratic nations. He could not, therefore, recommend that his Government give any gesture of welcome to Japan unless he were first satisfied that the terms of peace with China which Japan had in view could be reconciled with China's peace terms and would meet with the approval of the American Government.

Our host then talked very vaguely about the readiness of Japan to withdraw from central and South China, but when asked to give specifications he replied that a full statement on Japanese peace terms might better come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He undertook to report the conversation to Mr. Arita, and to suggest to Mr. Arita that he give the Ambassador a precise explanation of

Japanese objectives in China during the conversation which the Ambassador had arranged to have with Mr. Arita on May 18th.

Mr. and Mrs. Arita were entertaining the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew at luncheon on May 17, and Mr. Grew prearranged with me that I should endeavor during the luncheon party to ascertain from Mr. Arita whether our host of the previous day had consulted him. I accordingly took advantage of a favorable opportunity to engage Mr. Arita in conversation. I found that he was quite familiar with the discussion of the previous day. He said that there had been a suggestion that he give Mr. Grew an assurance that Japan would withhold any action to "strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact" until Mr. Grew returned to Washington and had an opportunity to discuss with his Government the possibility of making to Japan some "gesture of welcome". Mr. Arita said that there was no important opinion in the country unfavorable to the measure which had been proposed to combat communistic activities, and that, if the time became ripe for the conclusion of the agreement under discussion with Germany and Italy, the Japanese Government intended to proceed with it. He could, however, assure Mr. Grew that the agreement would contain no military, political or economic clauses; but with this proviso - if it were found that these activities were being instigated by the Soviet Government, the counter-measures

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proposed would have to be directed against that Government.

Mr. Arita then passed on to the negotiations between the Soviet and British Governments concerning the "common front against aggression". He said that Japan is very anxious to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe, but that Japan could not ignore the fact that Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and that, whether Japan liked it or not, its policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other. The British Ambassador had, he said, given him definite assurances that the arrangement under discussion by the British and Soviet Governments would specifically be made inapplicable, but he (Mr. Arita) replied that any arrangement which formed the basis for the close collaboration contemplated by Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union in respect of their common interests in Europe would be bound to bring about similar collaboration among them in the conduct of their policies in the Far East. He delivered himself at some length and with considerable show of heat over Sir Robert Craigie's insistence that the assurances given Mr. Arita should dissolve any Japanese anxiety with regard to the effective scope of the proposed arrangement. Mr. Arita concluded the conversation with me with the observation that decision over Japan's attitude vis-a-vis the situation developing in Europe would have to

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be withheld until results of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations were known.

A full account of the Ambassador's conversation on May 18 will be found in his telegram No. 235, May 18, 7 p.m.

The impressions which the Ambassador and I had formed of Mr. Arita's views as expressed in the conversations of May 17 and 18 agreed in every respect. It seemed to us that Mr. Arita, far from indicating any eagerness to find a way to approach the democratic nations, was preoccupied with the effects on the Far East of the establishment of the "front against aggression" and was not in a conciliatory mood. The Ambassador came, therefore, to the conclusion, as I did, that there was no justification for believing that desire to bring Japan into line with the democratic nations as against the totalitarian nations animated the Japanese Government as such.

Whether by accident or by design, I was approached on the same day, May 18, by a Japanese hitherto unknown to me but who had made the acquaintance of the Ambassador as a fellow passenger during a voyage across the Pacific, with the suggestion that I have a "chat", as he put it, with the Prime Minister. I asked the gentleman to call again, as I wished to consider the matter. I informed the Ambassador of the call and of the suggestion that I have a talk with the Prime Minister. Mr. Grew said that he had

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formed a favorable impression of Mr. Fujii, the person who had called on me, and that he saw no reason why I should not return a favorable reply. When Mr. Fujii called again, I said that I would be glad to have an opportunity to make the acquaintance of the Prime Minister, but that I had heard rumors of the possibility of a change of government and wondered, therefore, whether a call at that time would be opportune. Returning on the following day, Mr. Fujii brought an invitation from Baron Hiranuma to dinner on May 23, when he intended to explain his purpose in sending through Mr. Grew his message to the Secretary, and word to the effect that no change in the government was impending. I accepted the invitation. Mr. Fujii then emphasized the importance of keeping a profound secret the forthcoming talk. He said that Baron Hiranuma's political position was reasonably secure, but that the alignment of factions within the Government over European policy was so delicate as to require that the Prime Minister act very cautiously.

Mr. Fujii called for me on the evening of May 23. As we went in my car, which bears an Embassy license tag, Mr. Fujii proposed that we alight some distance from the Prime Minister's private residence and go the rest of the way on foot; we did. At the gate of the residence there stood a number of policemen, who, although obviously

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surprised by seeing a foreigner, made no attempt to stop me. The servants were prepared for my visit, but I have reason to believe that they, as well as two female relations of the Prime Minister's who served us later at dinner, and no knowledge whatever of my identity. It might be added that the residence, which is situated in the suburbs, is small and quite unpretentious and would barely grace a small tradesman. These details, while inconsequential, may perhaps reflect my impressions at the moment.

Baron Hiranuma received me very courteously. He said that he unfortunately had few opportunities to meet foreigners and thus to receive at first hand the impressions of foreigners with regard to conditions in various parts of the world. The situation in Europe was, in his view, a delicate one, and he felt confident that he could obtain from an American a more objective appraisal of that situation than he would be likely to procure from an European.

I expressed regret that I was not in a position to give him any information other than that which was public knowledge. There then ensued a colloquy on the situation in Europe, during which Baron Hiranuma displayed knowledge not only of a factual nature but of political trends in

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Europe which surprised me. One of the points brought out which, in his view, made for danger in Europe was that Chancellor Hitler - with the objectives which he has in mind for Germany to achieve - provides an issue around which all elements in Great Britain can rally; the imperialists, who do not propose to tolerate a Germany which can pretend to equality with Great Britain; the industrialists, who fear German commercial competition; and, finally, the Jews, radicals and even the Germanophiles, who, vie with each other in their hatred of Hitler.

Baron Hiranuma then said that the possibility of a war arising in Europe was one which he contemplated with horror. It would inevitably result in the total destruction of civilization, as no nation, however remote from the seat of war, would hope to escape the eventual consequences even though it might be fortunate to avoid direct involvement. He had publicly stated on several occasions that Japan could never be a democracy or a totalitarian state, and that Japan could make its greatest contribution by bringing together in harmonious and peaceful relations the two groups of nations. There were, he continued, elements in Japan which considered that Japan could not afford to maintain a condition of isolation and that her security demanded that she enter into "special relations" with Germany and Italy. He was insisting, however, that Japan follow what he termed "moral diplomacy". A nation's

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existence was not to be measured by decades, and it was essential, therefore, that statesmen charged with the destinies of national fix their attention on long term objective rather than on gaining favorable tactical positions, which were after all, ephemeral. The most important of these objectives was a stabilized peace to replace interludes of preparation for the next war. Japan, like the United States, was not directly involved in the troubles of Europe; and it was his thought that these two nations, which were the only Great Powers situated outside of Europe, were in a position to exercise a moderating influence on Europe. To exercise that influence was a duty which they owed their own peoples, for the downfall of Europe would inevitably bring with it the downfall of the rest of the world. In his opinion, the first step which had to be taken was to check the tendency toward the division of Europe into two politically hostile camps. He wondered whether the views of the American Government were responsive to those which he had expressed in his message to the Secretary.

I said that the American Government had taken a lead, in respect of both time and emphasis. In making known discord fact that nations are today interdependent and that discord between any nations is a matter of concern to all others. His message to the Secretary did not, I said, contain any definitive suggestion as to how the United States and Japan

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might proceed toward averting war in Europe. The principal difficulty, in my opinion, in the way of the collaboration which he had suggested in talking to me was Japan's policies and actions in China. I felt certain that the American Government would, in other more happy circumstances, have welcomed Japanese cooperation toward alleviating the threat to peace in Europe which, the great majority of Americans believed, arises from the policies and actions of Germany and Italy; and I doubted whether the American people would favor collaboration with a nation which it believed to be following in the Far East precisely those policies and actions that are considered to be the root of the trouble in Europe. I also said that the American people have laid before them nearly every day reports of bombings of American property and of other instances of violations of American rights and interests in China. The Foreign Office was trying to exculpate the Japanese military authorities by pleading military necessity or inadvertence, but enough had happened to justify belief that the the Japanese authorities, in China at least, were systematically and deliberately trying to expel American and other foreign interests from China. The views of the American people in these respects were, I said, very definitely formed. I could not but feel, therefore, that the adjustment of the conflict in China on terms satisfactory to all concerned would have to be a condition precedent to that degree of

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collaboration between the United States and Japan which could reasonably be expected to bring about the desired results in Europe.

The Prime Minister observed that he was well aware of the state of feeling which prevailed in the United States against Japan. The American people had assumed that Japan had deliberately provoked the conflict in China with a view to seizing the more populated and productive parts of that country, but he felt confident that the American Government realized that it had not been the original intention or desire of Japan to do anything more than to protect its rights in North China. It was also supposed by Americans that Japan intended to close the Open Door in China; and to his regret the actions of the Japanese authorities in China were not entirely reconcilable with the desire of the Japanese Government to respect foreign rights and interests in China. But he wondered whether the American Government realized that the Japanese people labored under a very real feeling of grievance against the Occidental Powers, especially Great Britain. When the Great War broke out, Japan was an ally of Great Britain. There were no legal obligations on Japan to support her ally, but she conceived that she had a moral obligation to do so. She accordingly declared war against Germany, her navy undertook operations against the German

fleet in the Pacific, her merchant marine cooperated in various ways, and finally her military forces eliminated Germany from Shantung. "The only thanks we got from Great Britain", continued Baron Hiranuma, "was the abrogation of that very alliance which inspired Japan to support Great Britain." Again, the rights which Japan had acquired in Manchuria as a result of her war with Russia and later by agreement with China were essential to Japan; nevertheless, the efforts of China to prejudice those rights were regarded by Great Britain and the United States with complacency, if not with benevolence; China took courage to persist, with the result that Japan had to resort to force in 1931 to protect those rights. Finally, the Japanese people came to the conclusion that the Nine Power Treaty and the Naval Treaties operated, not to stabilize peace in the Far East, but to bind Japan against safeguarding her interests in China. So long as the Japanese people felt that it had just cause for grievance, it was politically impossible for his government or any government which would succeed him to bring about complete equality of opportunity in China for all nations.

The Japanese people, Baron Hiranuma continued, have considerable sympathy for Germany and Italy, as they conceive these countries to be in many important respects in the same position as Japan. It was not to be expected

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that Germany would have permitted herself to remain under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, nor that Italy would have been content to be dependent on other nations for supplied of raw materials. At the same time, the consequences of efforts on their part to redress their grievances by force, or of the stubborn refusal of the democratic nations to offer to correct these grievances could not possible to confined to the protagonists in the European quarrel but would have to be shared by other nations. He referred to my observation that the settlement of the China conflict would probably have to be a condition precedent to joint American-Japanese efforts to moderate the situation in Europe. If that were to be the view of the American Government, any hope of proceeding along the course which he had in mind would have to be abandoned. The objectives which Japan has had in China are essential for her security in a world of sanctions, embargoes, closing of markets to foreign competition, and lack of free access to raw materials, and so long as such conditions exist any moderation or her objectives in China and, therefore, of her peace terms, could not be considered. Nevertheless if conditions could be brought about which would assure to all nations markets for the world's goods on the basis of quality and price and supplies of the materials which they needed, the importance to Japan of

securing a market and sources of raw materials in China would greatly diminish; and by the same token there would not be the urge that there now is on Germany and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker and smaller nations.

Baron Hiranuma stated that the conditions which brought about the situations in the Far East and Europe are not local but universal in character, and that neither situation could be settled in a manner calculated to bring about a stabilized peace unless the conditions which brought them about were corrected.

Baron Hiranuma said that the belief was widely held abroad that Japan was considering a military alliance with Germany and Italy. He had endeavored to explain frankly the basis of Japanese sympathy for Germany and Italy, and he could say quite definitely that the basis of what appeared to be a concerting of Japanese policy with that of Germany and Italy lay in the fact that all three countries are in the same economic strategic position. He personally was of the opinion that Japan, whose government would for all time to come rest on the sanctity of the Imperial Family, could not tie itself by special relations to any foreign government whose stability depended on the continued existence and political prestige of one individual. There were both in Germany and Italy political currents

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flowing beneath the surface which, in his view, would gravely prejudice confidence in any political arrangement, such as an alliance, which Japan might make with whose countries. Hidden dissident elements would be certain to make themselves felt in time of war and thus are to be reckoned as a threat to the success of German and Italian arms.

At this point we were interrupted by notice that dinner was served. The conversation during dinner was not in any way pertinent to the subject of this despatch, being confined to discussions of points in Chinese philosophy, personal reminiscences, and so on, the Prime Minister discoursing in a most interesting manner.

Returning to his study, the Prime Minister said that he wished to draw together the various threads of our conversations, as follows:

The United States and Japan were the only powers which could help to prevent the crystallization of the trend toward the division of Europe into armed camps. There can, however, be no confident hope that a permanent peace can be established until the world-wide economic and political conditions which bring about unrest in Europe and in the Far East can be corrected; and if an international conference can be called to solve the problems which create unrest, Japan would be prepared to agree to

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the inclusion of the Far Eastern situation among the problems to be discussed. Before any call for such a conference could be issued, Great Britain and France, and Germany and Italy, would have to be sounded out. If the President were prepared to make a confidential approach to the European democracies; he would be glad to approach Germany and Italy; and, if there were returned favorable replied by these nations, he would be glad to have the President call the conference under such conditions as might be agreed upon after discussion through normal diplomatic channels.

I wish to make it clear, before setting forth certain conclusion which I draw from these conversations, that I do not put forward the views of those Japanese - even though they be persons of great importance and influence - who harbor hopes of restoring good relations with the democratic nations, as being necessarily the views of the Japanese Government. These are, however, the views of a powerful element in the Government; they may prevail or they may not, but they cannot be ignored.

Any observer who is in any way sensitive to things not seen would, if he were in Tokyo today, become aware of the groping for security against the gathering storm in Europe. I should perhaps add parenthetically that the

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European situation today has assumed primary proportions, and that it would be visionary to suppose that the present confusion concerning the course which Japan should follow is due to despondence over the apparently ineffectual hostilities in China. The Army and other elements which have thus far controlled China policy have assumed that the Far Eastern conflict could be permanently and completely insulated against repercussions from situations elsewhere, as they did not look to American and other occidental armed intervention in that conflict. Although reference has been made in the Embassy's telegrams to the effects of the President's message to Chancellor Hitler, I do not believe that I could, by further reference to that message, exaggerate the impulse which it had toward persuading the Japanese Government to realize that there may be grave danger of involvement with the United States "not directly across the Pacific but by way of Europe", as one Japanese put it to me. I should, however, place that observation in proper perspective. A threat by the United States to eject Japan from China would, I am confident, be resisted. But if war were to break out in Europe with the United States participating on the side of Great Britain and France, the outcome in the view of those Japanese who think along rational lines would admit of no doubt. With Germany and Italy crushed, the prospect of confronting the

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victors would not be a palatable one to Japan.

There are, therefore, in the situation which seems to be developing but two courses for Japan to follow - either to go over unreservedly to the totalitarian side, or to restore good relations with those nations which, in the opinion of one element of the Japanese Government, would be the victors. True, in rejecting the proposal to join Germany and Italy in an alliance, Japan provisionally chose a third course - neutrality. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether there are many Japanese who confidently believe that neutrality would afford security. The arguments of those who believe in the superior power of Germany and Italy are obvious and simple: Japan has only to associate herself with those countries and wait for the European war to pick China like a ripe plum. But, for those Japanese who have other views concerning the power of Germany and Italy, there is but one way by which Japan's security can be safeguarded, and that is to bring the conflict with China to an end on some reasonable terms. Here again I wish to make it clear that the desire for a settlement of the conflict does not derive from moral regeneration but from realization of stark facts.

In concluding this despatch, which is already unconscionably long, I wish briefly to allude to the

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discrepancy between the attitude of the Prime Minister as indicated in his conversation with me and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose preoccupation over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations has already been mentioned. It is obvious that the desire of the Prime Minister for American collaboration to bring about peace in Europe (and in the Far East) cannot be reconciled with the readiness, which is almost an eagerness, on the part of the Foreign Minister to meet a fancied threat from Great Britain. These two points of view reflect conflicting policies, and which of these policies will prevail may perhaps be decided by events of the next few days.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ Eugene H. Dooman
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

EHD:C

D. D. 1500-E-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
8 April 1940.

8 April 1940.

DEAR JO: I have just been glancing over your letter of 8 February to Admiral Nimitz to check my memory on one of your questions as follows: I did it because of some information which came in this morning.

(a) Is "CinCus facing trouble in the Western Pacific" so surely as to warrant giving that consideration greater weight in the preparation of the flag slate than the usual peacetime considerations of training flag officers for higher command: If so, the best should be kept at, or ordered to sea.

I believe Nimitz answered your letter but was not able to answer the above question. I want now to answer that question with an emphatic affirmative. I believe the situation in the Far East is continually deteriorating so far as our relations with Japan are concerned. I may be unduly pessimistic but I do want to communicate my thoughts for what they are worth and I might add they are backed by some pretty concrete evidence. I think you should continually keep uppermost in your mind the possibility of trouble in the Orient, and the means to meet it.

The President has been troubled with a bad cold and we are about two weeks overdue in an appointment with him; however, we are hoping we will have it within the next few days and after he has agreed to the topside slate we will send you his desires for your further recommendations lower down.

I am also in hearty accord with the last paragraph of your letter and to save you the trouble of checking I am quoting it:

"If the eminence of trouble does not outweigh other considerations, I think that the most promising material for high command should be given adequate sea experience at the expense of the less promising, and that a long range plan should be prepared with a view to having the best possible available with recent Fleet experience and with adequate time to serve when those now in high position in the Fleet step out of the picture."

Here's hoping the Maneuvers are highly beneficial from every standpoint.

Every good wish as always, .

/s/ BETTY.

- 1 -



辯護士文書 一五〇〇一五〇一

エツチ、アール、スターク提督よりジェー、オー、リチャードソン
提督宛書信（一九四〇年四月八日）

ジョー殿

余は二月八日附ニミッツ提督宛の貴下の書信に唯今眼を通してゐた
ところですがそれは貴下の下記の如き疑問に對しての自分の記憶を
正したい爲です。それは今朝或る情報を入手したからです

(a) 「米海軍司令長官が西太平洋で困つてゐる」と云ふことは海軍の
將實を高級指揮の爲に訓練するといふ在り來りの平時の考へ方よ
り將官名簿の進補の方により大きな重點を置かなければならぬ程確
實性があるのか果して然らば最優秀な人材はそのまま海に勤務せし
むるか、又海上勤務を命ずべきである。

余はニミッツが貴下の書信に返事をしたと思ひますが右の疑問に
は答へることが出来なかつたでせう。余は今強い肯定を以て此の疑
問に答へ度いのです。

極東に於ける情勢は對日關係に關する限り絶えず惡化しつつあるに信じます。余は餘りにも悲觀的であるかも知れませんが、余の考へが當つてゐるかどうかは別として敢てそれをお傳へしておきたいと思ひます。余の考へには具體的な或る證據に基いてゐることを附言します。東洋に問題發生の可能性があること及それに對處すべき手段を絶えず貴下の念頭に置かれるべきであると思ひます。大體領は惡質の感冒に悩んでゐられるので我々は彼との面會の約束が約二週間延引してゐます。然し茲數日中には會へることを望んでゐる。そして彼が最級名簿に同意した上で、貴下の下級の者に對する推薦に關する彼の希望を御知らせしませう。

余は貴下の書信の最後の節に付ても滿腔の同意を表す。それを對照して見る手間を省く。茲に引用しよう、「問題が他の重要な事柄よりも急迫しないならば高級指揮官として最も有望な人材はさ程有望でない者達を犠牲にして海上勤務を十分に經驗せしめなければならぬ、そして最近の艦隊の經驗に依り又艦隊の高級將

校が退職しても相當期間内に合ふ様な可及的有效な最上策を得る目的を以て長期計畫が樹立せらるべきである、と考へる」
茲に貴署が凡ゆる點に於て極めて有益である様に祈ります。

ペテニー（署名）

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
7 May 1940.

(Copy of Mr. Edison's letter of 5/7 enclosed)

Confidential

Mailed 5/8/40 to catch clipper
of 5/14

7 MAY 1940.

Dear J. O.: Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian Waters for a couple of weeks.

When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the Fleet schedule be so arranged that on extremely short notice the Fleet be able to return concentrated to Hawaiian Waters. This will present somewhat of a problem in lugging around more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on board because if action is wanted it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see, your proposed schedule meets this requirement and unless you hear to the contrary you may assume it okay.

I am glad you want to run East to have a talk in the Department. Had you not suggested it, I would have myself. We have been making some close examinations into the War Plans recently and I remarked at the time I wished you could have been present. I trust your arrival here will not be delayed over about two weeks, beyond what it normally would have been.

Of course you know the thought behind the above and that is that the Italian situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical; then - - - ????? nobody can answer the riddle just now.

I am still hopeful that our Expansion Bill will go through. The Appropriation Bill has also to be acted on. Other than these two items nothing of particular interest that I can think of for the moment from the Fleet standpoint.

I hope to get money for elevation of the NEW YORK, TEXAS and ARKANSAS guns. My feeling is that these ships are of little use as is, and that even if they have to be out of the Fleet under overhaul at a critical time, we should go ahead with them. Do you concur?

Am also looking into the question of one or two more flag officers in Atron which I believe you desire.

Am delighted you are able to give War Plans your personal attention. Personally I think it is one of our most important jobs.

I don't know how you feel about it, but I have always felt that CincUS was loaded up with too much in the way of material matters and administration; and that in general material matters should not go beyond type commanders, at least as far as routine items are concerned. For example if Comatfor wants to find out something about his destroyers, he can send for Comdesbatfor tell him, or better still, let Comdesbatfor write him or see him frequently enough to keep him in general touch. It seems to me force commanders should not have to sign or even think about the thousand and one material details which must detract from their more important duties; let the type commanders do this.*

* This is just thinking out loud - but I would like to talk this over with you when you are here.

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
7 May 1940.

I know you have a tough job in submitting the names of six rear admirals from among whom three may be ear marked for furlough. I have got to do the same myself. If you and Peck agree it will automatically make it easier. I just mentioned to the President the advisability of appointing the three of us to constitute a board to actually meet and make this recommendation. This would take away any political repercussions so far as the President is concerned. However, he didn't take to this idea and said all he wanted was to be told verbally the names.

With best wishes as always

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.

辯護側書證一五〇〇E-2

昭和十五年五月七日附、ジェー・オー・リチャードスン海軍大將宛
エイチ・アール・スターク海軍大將の書翰

(五月七日附エデイスン氏書翰寫同封)

極秘

五月十四日のクリツバー機に間に合ふ様

昭和十五年五月八日 投函

昭和十五年五月七日

拜啓 今大統領と話をして電話を切つたところです。此の手紙が届く頃には貴君はもう二週間布哇水域に留まる様にとの知らせを受取つてゐるでせう。

大統領は艦隊が本國に歸還したら一週でも二週間は越えまいと思ふがそれは分らない。最短の豫告で以て布哇水域に歸航集結出来る様艦隊の行動豫定表を作る様にと要求されました。これは燃料を普通以上に持ち廻るといふ點と、行動が必要となる場合には迅速を要するので艦隊に一層多くの食糧を保有して置かなければならぬといふ點で貴君には聊か問題となるところでせう。か小生の見る限りでは貴君の行動豫定案は右の



要件にも合致して居り反對の命令に接せざる限り貴君の豫定表はオーケーと承知されてよいでせう。

海軍省で打合せをする爲め東行したいとの御希望は結構です。若し貴君から申出でなければ小生が提案するところでした。我々は最近戦争計畫に就て詳細な検討を加へました。其の際小生は貴君に加はつて貰ひたかつたと述べたのでした。貴君の當地着が順番に延びる豫定を越へて約二週間以上遅れることはないと思ひます。

勿論貴君には上記の言葉の陰の意味が分つてゐるでせう。即ち伊太利の情勢が極めて微妙であつて二週間後が危機と認められる、それから先は――――？？？誰も此の謎に今直ぐ答へられないのです。

小生は今なほ我が擴張案通過の希望を捨てません。豫算案も亦實施しなければなりません。艦隊の立場からは目下のところ此の二項を除いては特に關心を持つ事は思ひあたりません。

小生はニューヨーク號、テキサス號、アルカンサス號の艦砲の仰角を高くする爲め金が欲しい。小生の考へては之等諸艦は現在のまゝでは餘り役に立たないのでたとへ危急の際にこの三艦を點檢修理のため艦隊から

除外しなければならぬとしても、所信を斷行すべきであると思ふので
す。卑見に御同感なりや否や？

小生は又、貴君も御希望のことと思ふが大西洋小艦隊に艦隊司令官一、
二名増員の問題を考へて居ります。

何にしても貴君が戦争計畫に親しく考察を加へることが出来るのは喜ば
しい。これは我々にとり最も重大なる仕事の一つであると小生自身は考
へて居ります。

貴君は如何に考へになるか知らないが、小生の何時も考へて居るのは合
衆國艦隊司令長官が物資上の問題や軍行政に就て餘り荷が多過ぎるとい
ふこと、一般物質上の条件に於ては少くとも平常事項に關する限り艦艇
隊司令以上に回付してはならないといふことです。例へば若し艦隊司令
官が其の麾下の驅逐艦に就て何か知りたいたと思つた時には司令官は驅逐
艦隊司令官を呼んで報告させることか出来るし或は又全般的連絡を保つ
様屢々面會又は文書による報告をさせるのも更によい方法でせう。艦隊
司令官に澤山の微細な軍務について一々署名したり考へたりさせてはな
らないと思ひます。それは司令官のもつと大切な任務を妨げるといふも

のです。それは艦艇隊司令にさせるべきものと思ひます。

これは今考へて居ることを一寸述べたのです。一此事に就ては貴下が當地に見へてから話すことゝ致しませう。

小生は貴君が海軍少將六人を指名しそのうち三人に賜暇の豫定をして報告しなければならぬ事は仲々面倒な仕事だと存じます。小生も亦同様の事をしなければなりません。貴下とベックとが御同意なら事は自然容易に運ぶと思ひます。小生は大統領に我々三人を委員に任命し實際に會合して右の推舉を掌る委員會を構成する方が宜しからうにと申しました。斯くすれば大統領に關する限り政治上の反響を取除くことが出来る譯です。然し大統領は此の意見を取上げず自分の望む所は名前を口頭で述べて欲しいのだと申しました。

敬具

ベッテイー（署名）

布哇、眞珠灣、合衆國軍艦ベンシルバニヤ號、
合衆國艦隊司令長官
海軍大將ジェー。オー。リチードスン閣下

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(46) 6 December 1941 to COM 14, Action: OPNAV

(46) Top Secret.
December 6, 1941
From: COM FOURTEEN
Action: OPNAV
Info:
Ø6Ø114

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

(Page 1409, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯護側文書 一五〇〇一E一四

真珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會證據書類第三十七封被萃
米國第七十九國會第一會期

證據書類第三十七號

基礎證據電報書類

(四六) 一九四一年十二月六日 第十四司令部

作戰關係、海軍作戰部宛

(四六) 極秘

一九四一年十二月六日

發信者 第十四司令部

作戰關係海軍作戰部

連絡

〇六〇一一四

出先領事は唯一つの被式を除き總て破毀せるものと信ず。但し
貴方第三號の一八五五は含まれざるが如し。

(「真珠灣攻撃」第十四卷一四〇九頁)



グラムは、當面の用途及特殊情報に必須なるものを除く總ての機秘密書類其他分類せる書類を破毀すること。但し大西洋艦隊司令長官、太平洋艦隊司令長官、第十四管區司令部、第十六管區司令部、及海軍作戰部との緊要通信に必要な最少限度の暗號手段を保留すべし。非常の際は貴下の保留する總ての分類書類を直ちに破毀する如く準備し置くべし。保留暗號手段を報告せよ。

(眞珠灣攻撃—第十四卷一四〇八頁—)

Chungking, November 25, 1941

Lauchlin Currie

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any "Modus Vivendi" now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

Lattimore

Copy of Message Transmitted to Secretary Stimson by
Mr. T. V. Soong, Under Cover of a Letter Dated November 25.

"TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL CHIANG KAI SHEK TO DR. T. V.
SOONG DATED CHUNGKING, NOVEMBER 25, 1941

"I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram yesterday. Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox and Stimson immediately.

"Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency, the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They have even come to a silent but none the less definite understanding with the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone.

"We could therefore only request the United States Government to be uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies from China is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or freezing could not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American attitude remains

nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its fell purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the breakdown of our resistance. Our more than four years of struggle with the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do not indeed know how history in future will record this episode."

EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK - CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES. PART 14.
PAGES 1160 - 1161.

-2-



辯護文書第一五〇〇號E一五

一九四一年十一月二十五日重慶

ローチリン キュリー

中國大使と國務長官との話し合いについて私は大元帥と協議してから私は大元帥が非常な衝撃を受けたことを貴方から大流領に大至急御報告になる必要があるように思います。私はこれまでに大元帥がこんなに動搖されたのを嘗て見たことはありません。經濟的壓迫を緩和することや凍結を解除することは日本の中國に於ける軍事的地歩を更に有利にする危険が多分にあります。日本が中國に軍隊を駐屯させてゐる間はアメリカの壓迫を緩和することは中國人を失望させるでせう。現在中國との間に締結されている如何なる暫定條約もアメリカに對する中國人の信用を害うもので、これは英國の威信を永久に失墜させたビルマ道路の閉鎖に似ています。日本と中國の敗戦主義者はそれから生ずる幻滅を直ちに利用して西洋の裏切りに對して東洋團結の必要を説くことでせう。過去に於

けるアメリカの援助も今后支援を増加してもこの期に及んで見棄てられたという感情の償をすることが出来るかどうか疑わしいものです。大元帥は大統領が一貫した政策を忠實に守ることに深い信頼を寄せています。が日本が外交上の勝利によつて軍事的敗北を免れたという報道によつて中國のアメリカに對する國民的信頼が覆されたとしたら大元帥でさへこの時局を乗り切る能力が自分にゐるかどうか疑つてゐることを私は貴方に御警告申し上げなければなりません。

ラテイモ

2

十一月二十五日附の手紙で宋子文氏よりスチムスン長官に送られた通信の寫

重慶發一九四一年十一月二十五日附の蔣介石大將より宋子文博士への電報

胡適大使が昨日私の電報の寫を貴方に渡したことを思います。どうか通信の内容をノックス長官及スチムスン長官に傳えて下さい。

どうか兩長官に時局の重大さを説明して下さい。

萬一アメリカが經濟封鎖や日本資産の凍結を緩和するか或はまた合衆國がこの事を考慮しているという噂が廣まつただけでも我が軍隊の志氣は、
、どく動搖することとせう。過去二ヶ月間日本の宣傳は十一月には合衆國との間に協定が成立する確信ある旨をいいふらして來ました。

日本人は我が國のめやしい奴等と暗々裡ではありますがある具體的の了解に達しております。それ故に若し輸出禁止令や凍結令が緩和されるか或はさういう噂が信せられるやうになつたならば、中國は完全に合衆國の犠牲になつたと中國人は考えるでせう。全國民の志氣は地に墜す凡てのアジアの國家は何れも信頼を失ひ。實際彼等のデモクラシーに對する信頼は非常な衝撃を受けて世界に於ける最も悲劇的な紀元が始まることとせう。中國人は潰滅し、日本人はその計畫を貫徹することが出來、その結果將來アメリカが我々の救援にやつて來たとしても時局は已に絶望的となつてゐるでしょう。かかる損失は單に中國だけのものゝはありません。

それ故に我々は唯合衆國政府が妥協を排して日本軍の中國撤退が解決しないならば輸出禁止や凍結を緩和する問題は考えられない旨を聲明するやうお願い致す次第です

一方アメリカの態度が依然として曖昧である限り日本の宣傳は日に日にその恐怖すべき目的を達成し日本人には少しの損失も與えずにこの宣傳は我々の抵抗を挫折させることでしよう。

四年以上に亘る歴史上その類をみない無數の人命の喪失、犠牲、荒廢を齎した我々の惡戦苦闘は全く無駄なものになります。この確實な我々の抵抗の挫折は必ずや世界にとつては未だ嘗てない災厄となります。將來の歴史がこの挿話をどのようにに記録するか實際私には全く分りません。

合衆國議會—眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會に於ける査問からの抜萃

十四部一一六〇—一一六一頁



Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
13 May 1940.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
May 13, 1940



Dear Betty:

When Hill was detached last January he took with him to Washington some ideas, largely Bloch's, as to what might be acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, (under the assumptions then made), to serve as a start from which Op-12 would develop basic assumptions to be officially transmitted, within a few weeks, to the Commander-in-Chief for use in making plans.

During a recent conference in the Twelfth Naval District it was brought out that we were woefully short of 5"-38 caliber ammunition at Mare Island.

I am unable to grasp the meaning of Cpnay dispatch 112130 sent at 1630 last Saturday, but we are guessing that the Department has tentatively approved, with minor exceptions, the contents of the memorandum prepared for me by Hill, and that the Department will correct the ammunition situation at Mare Island.

The assumptions under which the Hill memorandum was drawn up and under which all other operations in the Western Pacific have previously been considered, are today all different. Previous assumptions and estimates of the situation no longer hold.

It seems that, under present world conditions, the paramount thing for us is the security of the Western Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends everything -- anything certainly in the Far East, our own or other interests.

South America is the greatest prize yet remaining to be grabbed. Until the outcome in Europe can be more clearly seen, security in the Western Hemisphere seems to be the most important consideration for us.

I feel that any move west means hostilities. I feel that at this time it would be a grave mistake to become involved in the West where our interests, although important, are not vital, and thereby reduce our ability to maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere which is vital.

If the Fleet is to go west it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.

Rest assured that although I am entirely without information I realize your position, and I want you to know that if the situation becomes such that higher authority decides we should go West, all of us are ready to give all we have.

These are some of the things I wanted to talk to you about, and since I can not see you, I feel that I am duty bound to write you.

D. D. 1500-F-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
13 May 1940.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

Please acknowledge receipt by despatch.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

P. S. On 9 April I sent Andrews with a detachment in to simulate a raiding force against Pearl Harbor, to serve as an object for attack by our patrol planes and Army bombers. Andrews reported sighting Navy patrol planes, but he did not see any Army bombers.

Today we were picked up by our patrol planes about 0630, but we did not see any Army bombers. However, our submarines made several successful attacks from fairly short ranges. We had a heavy swell with white caps so that it was difficult to see the submarines.

While the Secretary was on board, one of the SARA-TOGA'S fighting planes had a forced landing close aboard. The plane sank, but the Reserve Ensign was recovered without his even getting his feet wet.

Today one of the LEXINGTON bombing planes (SBU) had a forced landing. The plane sank, but the pilot and passenger were recovered with slight injuries.

The PENNSYLVANIA should anchor in Lahaina about 1700.

/s/ J. O. R.

辯護文書一五〇〇一

一九四〇年五月十三日

海軍大將 ジエイ・オー・リチャードソン發

海軍大將 エイチ・アール・スターク宛書簡

司令官綴第 號

アメリカ合衆國艦隊

米艦ペンシルバニア旗艦

布哇 眞珠灣

一九四〇年五月十三日



ベッテイ殿

Def. Doc #1500F-1

去る一月ヒルが派遣された時作戦第十二號の基本的想定―それは二、三週中に計畫作製の資料として司令長官迄公式送達さるべきものであります。―の展開さるべき手初めとして司令長官にとて當時の考へて如何なることが満足なものであらうかについて、若干の案を―その大部分はプロツシュの考案にかゝる―をワシントンにもつて行きました。

第十二海軍區で開かれた最近の會議に於てメーア島に於て五インチ、三八口徑の彈藥が甚しく不足してゐることが明にされました。

小官は土曜の十六時三十分に送附された海軍命電文一一二一三〇の意味がわかりませんが、ヒルが小官の爲に準備した覺書の内容は一部を除いた位で省の方で認められたことゝ察して居ります又メーア島の彈藥狀況も改善することにしたであらうと吾々は推察してゐます。

ヒル覺書が書かれ又西太平洋に於ける總ての他の作戰が考慮された以前、の想定は今日では全く違つてをり、以前の想定及狀況判斷はもはや適用され得ません。

現世界狀勢下に於ては吾々にとつて先づ考へねばならぬことは西半球の安全であると思ひます

此は、小官の考へでは極東に於ける何物よりも吾々の利益又他の利益何よりも先に考へらるべきだと思ひます。

南アメリカは今も尙手中に入れられるものゝ中で最大の獲物であります。ヨーロッパの歸趨が一層見通しのつく迄は、西半球の安全は吾々に

とつて最大の關心事のようにあります。

小官は西への動きは何事たるを問はず戦鬪を意味するものであると思はれます。現在に於ては、吾々の利害が重要ではあるが生命に關はる程ではない西方に掛り合ひになり、それによつて吾々の生命に關はる西半球の安全を維持する實力を減じることとは、重大なる過誤であらうと感じられます。

若し艦隊が完全な準備の下に西に動くとなれば艦隊の碇泊、乗組、積載、解装の可能なる西海岸から、頃合ひの隊形に集合出來得た後に於てのみ出發出來ます。

小官は全々情報に接しません貴官の立場はよく理解して居ります故御安心下さい。そして情況止むを得ず上官が吾々の西航を決定する如きことに立至りましたならば、吾々は皆總てを捧げる覺悟であります。

以上は小官のお話し申し上げたいと思つて居たことでありますが、拜眉も得られませんので、書面にて御報告するを義務と感じた次第であります。

ジェー・オーリチャードソン 署名

手紙が到着しましたら電文にてお報せ下さい。

コロムビア地区ワシントン市海軍省、海軍作戦部長米國海軍大將エイチ・アール・スターク

追伸

四月九日に小官は眞珠灣攻撃隊の模倣隊として又吾が海軍偵察機及陸軍爆撃機による攻撃の目標とするためにアンドレウス以下分遣隊を送りました。アンドレウスは海軍偵察機を認めたことは報告しましたが、陸軍爆撃機は認めませんでした。

今日吾々は六時三〇分頃海軍偵察機に発見されましたが陸軍爆撃機は認めませんでした。然し海軍潜水艦は可成近距離から幾つかの攻撃に成立ちました。うねりが大きくて白波が立つてゐたので潜水艦を認めることは困難でした。

大臣が乗艦中にサラトガの攻撃機の一が舷側近く不時着しました。飛行機は沈みましたが當の豫備役少尉は足も濡らさずに救はれました。

今日はレキシントンの爆撃機(SBU)が不時着しました、機體は沈

Def. Doc 1500F-1

みました。が操縦士と乗員は大した傷も受けずに救はれました。
ペンシルバニアは十七時頃ラハイナに投錨する筈です。

ジェイ・オーアル 署名

F-2
D. D. 1500-K-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
27 June 1940. (With enclosures)

"COPY"

SECRET

U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Tuesday, 18 June 1940.



Memo. for Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Rear Admiral Bloch visited me yesterday stating that he had just been informed by General Herron, in secret, that he (Herron) had just received orders from the War Department placing Army in this area on the "Alert". This was done with special emphasis on possible carrier and plane attacks. He asked Bloch for a distant air patrol and inner air patrol.


I explained to Bloch your present patrol plan and informed him that I would establish immediately an inner patrol which I did at 1300 yesterday and am continuing same. General Herron desires that a VP patrol be established covering western semi-circle with Oahu as center instead of present VP patrol from Lahaina which as you know covers from 220 to 335 distance 180 miles.

I agree with Herron and I have VP to establish such a patrol which must begin at dawn each day.

I have discussed this matter with Fitch who is ready to start when you give the order.

I have also informed Rear Admiral Calhoun in secret.

If you desire this patrol established in lieu of present patrol I suggest that you send Combase for a message "Affirm patrol" and this new patrol will be started tomorrow. Such a patrol is pictures as below:



Sector to be searched daily - Western semi-circle. The Army will cover night patrol, leaving us day patrol only.

Calhoun and I are awaiting instructions.

Respectfully,

/s/ Adolphus Andres

I sent "Affirm Patrol" to Andrews on receipt of this.

JOR

(Defense Note: Above sentence in "handwriting.")

- 2 -
- 1 -



一九四〇年六月二十二日附 海軍大將 J・O・リチードソン 發
海軍大將 H・R・スターク 宛書簡 (文書同封)

「寫」

秘

アメリカ合衆國、軍艦インディアナポリス號、ハワイ准州眞珠灣

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)六月十八日火曜日

アメリカ合衆國艦隊司令長官關係メモ

ブロック海軍少將は昨日私を訪れて該地區に陸軍を警戒配備につかしめるより陸軍省からヘロン陸軍大將が命令を受けたことを秘に同大將から丁度聞いた旨を述べました。此の陸軍省の措置は敵の行ふかも知れない空母及航空機攻撃に特別の重點を置いて爲されたものです。ヘロンはブロックに遠空偵察及内空偵察をなすよう要請しました。

私はブロックに貴官の現偵察計畫を説明し直に内空偵察に取り掛る旨


を告げましたが昨日午後一時に之を行ひその後之を繼續して居ります。
ヘロン陸軍大將は御存知の如く、ラハイナより百八十哩、二百二十乃至
二百三十五哩の距離に互る現VP偵察の行はれることを望んでゐます。
私はヘロンと同感であり、毎日拂曉に始める偵察を行ふべきVPをも
つてゐます。

私は此の問題を露官の命令あり次第開始しようと待機してゐるフイツ
チと相談しました。

私はまたカルハウン海軍大將にも秘に通知しました。

若し貴官が現在の偵察の代りに此の偵察を行はうと思はれるやうでし
たらコムバセフォール宛と「偵察確認」の電文を御送りになれば、此新
偵察は明日から開始されます。

此の偵察は左圖の通りです。



毎日捜索すべき扇状区域　　西半園。
陸軍が夜間偵察をやり吾々は只晝間偵察だけをやることになつてゐます。
カルハウンと私は指令を待つてゐます。

教　具

アドルフ・アス・アドレス（署名印）

私は入手と同時に「偵察確認」をアドルフ・アスに發電した。

J O R

（辯護四註・右一文は肉筆）

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(9) 16 August 1941, Subject: Developments in the Far Eastern Situation.
(Excerpt)

I. B. 112

AUGUST 16, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Developments in the Far Eastern Situation.

.

3. Since the adoption of the policy outlined in paragraph 1 above Japan has secured military and economic control of Indo-China, is in a position to enforce her military and economic demands on Thailand and to threaten the vital Burma railroad and road, and has increased the strength of the Kwantung Army (in Manchoukuo) to about 600,000 officers and men as opposed to a Russian force, east of Lake Baikal, of about 400,000. The following factors, however, unfavorable to the successful implementation of Japan's aggressive policy, have been injected into the situation:

a. The German time-table for the subjugation of the U.S.S.R. has gone awry.

b. The United States and Great Britain have frozen Japanese assets.

c. Great Britain has announced an embargo in exports to Japan.

d. The American, British and Dutch armed forces in the southwestern Pacific have been materially strengthened.

e. Great Britain and the United States have pledged aid to the U.S.S.R. and additional aid to China.

f. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have announced accord on an eight point program which, while not mentioning Japan by name, presents a long-range threat to her position as an Axis Power and to the retention of her conquests.

.

5. There are clear indications that, in spite of the decisions outlined in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Japanese Government is willing to take extraordinary diplomatic measures to keep the United States out of the war, at least temporarily. There are indications that Japan is unwilling to commit herself to the extent that Germany would like to see her committed. There are indications that Japan realizes that she must make some concessions to the strong political stand now taken by the United States, even though those concessions consist largely in further conversations and negotiations.

6. Considering all of the above, this Division believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area and of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

辯護國書類一五〇一三號

眞珠灣攻撃調査ニ關スル共同委員會製作

卷證第三三號ヨリ拔萃

米國第七十九議會第一會期

卷證第三十三號

陸軍省G-12作製

陸軍情報部狀況判斷

(華府・デイストリクト・オブ・コロンビア)

九、一九四一年八月十六日

樞東狀勢ノ展開ニ關スル件 (拔萃)

I. B. 一一二

一九四一年八月十六日

參謀總長宛覺書

樞東狀勢ノ展開ニ關スル件

(三) 前段第一節ニ概述セル政策ヲ採用シテ以來日本ハ印度支那ノ軍事の經濟



的支配ヲ獲得シ、泰國ニ對スル軍事、經濟的要求ヲ強力ニ推進シ、且重要此ノ上ナイ緬甸交路ヲ脅ヤカス形勢ニ在リ、其上「バイカル」湖以來ノ約四十萬ソ聯軍ニ對抗シテ、在滿洲東軍將兵ヲ大略六十萬ニ增強シタ。然シナガラ、日本ノ侵略政策ノ達成ニハ不利ナル以下諸國ガ現狀勢ニ新タニ加ハハツテキル。

(イ)ソ聯征服ニ關シテ立テラレタル獨側計畫ハ失敗セリ

(ロ)英米ハ日本資產ヲ凍結セリ

(ハ)英國ハ日本向輸出禁出ヲ宣言セリ

(ニ)西南太平洋ニ於ケル米英蘭軍事兵力ハ著シク增強セラレタリ

(ホ)英米ハ對ソ援助及更ニ對支援助ノ強化ヲ約言セリ

(ヘ)直接日本ノ名ヲ擧ゲザルモ、樞軸國トシテノ日本ノ地位及ビ其ノ征服地ノ保持ニ關シ、多大ナ脅威ヲ與ヘルハケ條ヨリ成レル計畫ニツキ、米大統領及ビ英首相間ニ意見ノ一致ヲ見タル旨發表セラレタリ。

(五)前記第一節及二節ニ概述セル日本側ノ決意ニモ拘ラズ、尙モ日本政府ニ於テハ合衆國ヲ、少クトモ暫時ノ間、戰爭ニ捲キ込マナイヨウニ特別ナ外

交的措置ヲ講ズルノニ吝カナラザル形跡歴然タルモノガウカガハレル。獨逸ガ希望スル程度ノ措置ニ出ルコトヲ、日本ハ好マヌコトガ察セラレレル。今ヤ米國ニヨツテ執ラレタル斷乎タル政治的態勢ニ對シ、或程度ノ讓歩モ已ムヲ得ナイトスル氣運ガ日本側ニ動イテキル形跡ガアル。尤モ、今ノ所ニ於テ尙モ、是等讓歩ハ多分ニ將來ノ會談、交渉ノ如何ニカカツテ居ルモノデア

ル。
(六) ココニ於テ案ズルニ、我方ニ於テ、軍事的並ビニ經濟的壓力ヲヨリ強化シ、以テ日本ニ對シテ強力ナル外交政策ヲ展開スルナラバ、夫ガ時ヲ緣グニハ最善ノ機會デアリ、太平洋ニ戰火ノ熾マルノヲ最モ能ク防止シ得、遂ニハ三國協定ヲ破綻ニ導キ得ルモノデアルト本局ニ於テハ信シテ疑ハヌ。斯クテ合衆國ニ於テハ、増々強力ニ力ニヨル外交ヲ推進スベキハ自ラ明白デア

配布先

大統領
陸軍長官

陸軍次官
參謀總長

作戰部
海軍情報部
エンビツク大將

米國陸軍准將

參謀次長代理 G-1 二

シヤーマン マイルズ

大統領
陸軍長官

陸軍次官
參謀總長

作戰部
海軍情報部
エンビツク大將

Defense Doc. 1500-F-4

Exhibit No. 38 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 38

(Copy)

Drafting Section:
Administrative
Drafting Officer
T.J.B.
G-2 File Number:

PARAPHRASE OF AN OUTGOING SECRET RADIOGRAM

No. 40, Sent Dec. 3, 1941
Date: December 3, 1941

To: Military Attache; American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan

Memorize emergency key word #2 for use of SIGNUD without repeat without indicators, destroy document stop SIGNNQ, SIGPAP and SIGNDT should be retained and used for all communications except as last resort when these documents should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD used stop destroy all other War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word BINAB stop early rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State Department informed you may advise Ambassador.

MILES

Drafting Section:
Administrative
Drafting Officer
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辯護側文書一五〇〇一F四

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會證據書第三十八號
會、第一會期

證據書第三十八號(局)

起案部課行政部

起案時校テイ・ジェー・ビー

G-二處理番號

發送機密無線電報の解釋

一九四一年十二月三日添附第四十號

日付、一九四一年十二月三日

宛先 日本東京、米國大使館附陸軍武官

繰返はなく、見出しなき SIGNO 使用の爲の非常暗號解讀語第二號を
暗記し、暗號を破滅せよ。SIGNO SIGPAR 及 SIGNO は最後手段とし



(真珠湾攻撃—第十四號一四〇九頁)

てこれら書類が破毀され、暗記したる **SIGNS** が用ひらるべき場合を除きこれを保留し直と總ての通信に用ふべし。他の總ての陸軍省附牒及暗號は直ちに破毀し、暗號文字 **SECRET** に依り通知せよ。對日外交關係早期断絶の徴あり。財務省は貴下の大使に官方通告し來れり。

マイルス

TELEGRAM SENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington
November 27, 1941

EMBASSY,
TOKYO (JAPAN)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR

In the light of the attitude of Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu when they were handed on November 26 for consideration the document described in a separate telegram and of such indications as we have cumulatively had of the general attitude of the Japanese Government, it appears that the discussions up to the present time have not repeat not yet afforded any basis which gives much promise of a satisfactory compromise settlement. It is of course too early to adopt any definite opinion whether the discussions will continue or will lapse, but the probability that they may lapse should not repeat not be lost sight of.

The existence of such probability makes it appear advisable that we give some advance consideration to various problems which may as a consequence arise in connection with our Foreign Service establishments in Japanese territory. As lapse of the conversations might result in withdrawal of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan, it would seem to us that, without any intention of being alarmist or of too hastily envisaging serious contingencies, this question should be brought to your attention so that you may have it well in mind in case it should become necessary for the Department to consult you in regard to the making of arrangements for the packing of official and personal effects and the expeditious handling of other matters which would be involved in the closing of our Embassy and Consulates. It is, of course, desired that all phases of the matter be considered confidential and that discussion of it be kept to a minimum.

HULL

EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF
THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK - CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES. PART 14.
PAGES 1184 -- 1185

であると思はれる。交渉の立ち消えは我が外交官及領事館代表の日本引揚げに至るかも知れない故に無用に人脈がせをする譯でなく又偶發的重大事件を早計に豫期する考はないが我が大使及び領事館の閉鎖に伴ふ公私財産の荷重り及び其他の學術の迅速處理に對する準備に就て國務省より貴下に相談する必要が生ずる場合よく心得て居て貰ふやう此問題に注意して居られたい。此問題の全局面が勿論秘密裡に考慮されそれにつき相談事は最小限度に爲される事が望しい。

ハ

ル

米國議會、眞珠灣攻撃査閱共同委員會に於ける聴取報告終

第十四部、一一八四頁—一一八五頁

海軍圖書證第一五〇〇號『五』

昭和十六年十一月二十七日

ワシントン、國務省發電

東京

米國大使館

大使親展

十一月二十六日、村大將と來栖氏に別電にて説明せる文書を熟慮を求めんがため手渡した時の彼等の態度に鑑み又吾々が日本政府の一方的態度に就て蒐集して居る情報に鑑み現在迄の交渉は満足すべき総合的解決に對し多大の希望を興へる様な根據は何らないやうに思はれる。交渉が進展するか又は立ち消えになるかに關して明確な意見を建てる事は勿論尙早であるが然し交渉が立ち消えになりさうである事は念頭に置かねばならない。

此可能性があるから結果として日本領土内にある米國公館に關連して發生するかも知れぬ種々な問題に對し或程度事前の考慮を吾々が拂ふ事は賢明

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
22 May 1940.

H. R. S.

Serial 013212
Secret

22 MAY 1940.

DEAR JOE: When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy were coming in almost immediately and that a serious situation might develop in the East Indies, and that there was a possibility of our being involved. However, the recent "blitzkrieg" events in Europe have certainly altered the picture for the time being. Personally I think it has made more remote (for the moment at least) the question of a westward movement of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself. I also realize events may change this picture and possibly over night.

With regard to the specific questions raised in your letter of 13 May, the Joint Plan for Rainbow Two is about complete, and a copy of it, including the studies upon which it is based, will go to you shortly by officer messenger. This Joint Plan embraces in general all the basic assumptions listed in the memorandum Hill brought East. The joint tasks of this plan will require the operation of the Fleet in general with the fleet tasks set up in Hill's memorandum.

I think these assumptions are about the best upon which a basic plan of this nature can be promised, although in any preliminary operating plan which you may prepare at present, I think you should assume the present strength and disposition of the Fleet, in order to develop the problem from a practical basis.

As you get time in these strenuous days, I believe it would be advisable for you to go ahead with the preparation of a tentative Fleet Operating Plan for Rainbow Two, as we are most anxious to have the benefit of your detailed study of the difficulties involved, and the logistic and other requirements.

I wish you would keep constantly in mind the possibility of a complete collapse of the Allies, including the loss of their fleets. A very probable development of such a catastrophe is visualized in the Rainbow One Plan. Should the Allied fleets pass into the hands of the Germans, however, an entirely different, and far more serious situation would exist. I would appreciate your views regarding the best disposition of fleet forces in such an event.

Regarding the 5 inch 38 caliber ammunition we have realized the deficiency, and, as you probably know, Ordnance has now arranged for shipment of 20,000 rounds on the PYRO. We understand that this will complete the first increment of the mobilization supply on board and will give some room for target practice ammunition. It is my understanding that there will still be enough on shore on the West Coast and in Hawaii to meet mobilization requirements. I would be glad if you would confirm this.

I find that the 6 inch 47 caliber reserve supply on the West Coast is now what it should be. There are 6,000 shells out there and I have requested the Bureau of Ordnance to send a like quantity of powder by rail.

We are taking up the question of another Flag Officer in ATRON which you suggested. We hope to put this in effect in the near future; the idea being to assign this officer as Commander Destroyers Atlantic Squadron. Present plan is to rig up something on the DENEbola for him to use as an Administrative Flag Ship and then assign an interim one of the new

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
22 May 1940.

1500 ton destroyers as a Tactical Flag Ship with the idea of recalling from the Fleet the SAMPSON (which seems most logical choice) or another 1850 destroyer to take the place of this new 1500 tonner tentatively assigned. On account of the antiaircraft armament on the 1500 tonners I feel that the 1500 tonner would be more valuable to you than the SAMPSON, and at the same time the SAMPSON would give a little more room for Flag Quarters and Operating Staff accommodations. I do not want to tie up another cruiser as a separate Flag Ship. I sometimes feel there has been too much of this already. This seems to be the best solution for the problem, unless you can suggest a better one.

In regard to the disposition of cruisers I feel that the ST. LOUIS and HELENA should join the Fleet as soon as they are out of the Yard. They should get Fleet Training. They are valuable units to you. If we take them out of the Atlantic and send them to the Pacific I must replace them. Under the present situation the reduction in cruiser strength as it is, should, if anything, be augmented. There are two possible solutions: one, to assign Rowcliff and Cruiser Division FIVE to the Atlantic. This would give two heavy cruiser Divisions in the Hawaiian Detachment and two in the Atlantic. The other is to send Fletcher's Division, Cruiser Division THREE, to the Atlantic which would give one heavy Cruiser Division and one light Cruiser Division in the Atlantic, but would reduce your Light Cruiser strength by one Division and would give you a total of three heavy cruiser divisions in the Pacific. Of course as soon as the TRENTON comes home from Europe we will have her overhauled and she will be available for duty where most needed in the Atlantic or Pacific in case either Cruiser Division THREE or FIVE is sent to the Atlantic. Please let me have your perfectly frank reaction to the above by dispatch (supplemented by air mail if you so desire).

You may draw back at the thought of reducing your cruiser strength at this time in the Pacific. This I can believe might well be your inclination, - as it would be mine. But, as I indicated above, the changing situation may push the decision one way or the other. In fact the picture may change by the time you get this letter to the extent that it may be necessary to send a real component of the Fleet to the Atlantic much as we would hate to do so and thus divide our forces.

The ST. LOUIS is due to be completed in Norfolk 15 July.
The HELENA in New York, 9 July.

The situation in some of the South American countries gives real cause for concern - and I say this advisedly. If Germany should win - then what????

Wish I could see you - and if the pressure here - day and night ever lets up - I hope to fly out.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. Please acknowledge by dispatch.

Have literally lived on the Hill - State Dept. - & White House

D. D. 1500-G-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
22 May 1940.

for last several days. Thank God yesterday I finally swung support for 170,000 men and 34,000 marines. Lots still in the mill - but I hope coming.

I hope to commission the remaining 35 DDs, 3 AOs and 36 SS - another personnel nightmare for the fleet - but I simply couldn't do it before.

Here's hopin.

BETTY.

機密 御文書一五〇〇一G-1

昭和十五年五月二十二日

スターク海軍大將参

J、O、リチャードソン海軍大將宛書翰

機密 機密番號〇一三二二二

H. R. S.

昭和十五年五月二十二日

秘

親愛なるデヨールへ

私共が電報を送した時はイタリアが今直ぐにも参りし、東印度諸島では状況が重大化し、又我國も之に捲込まれる可能性がある如くに思はれました。然し最近歐洲に起つた「電燈塔」事件は常分の間の状況を確かに變へてしまひました。私一個の考へでは、この事件によつてわが米國艦隊の西方移動問題は（少くとも此處暫くの間は）縁遠いものになつてしまつたと思ひます。私は貴下の誓面の趣旨に同意でありまして、私自身既に斯様の意見を表明して居りますことを御承知になつて御喜び下さることと思ひます。又私は事件が状況を變へることも恐ら



くは一夜の中に變へて了ふかも知れないと感ちて居ります。

五月十三日の貴下の御書翰に見える特種御質問に關しては、虹第二號に對する共同計畫が殆んど完成してゐることをお答へします。而して、この計畫の寫し一通が同計畫の基礎になつた研究と共に近々使者の將校によつて御手許に届けられることゝ思ひます。この共同計畫は大體に於てヒルが東部に持つて來た覺書中に列擧されてゐる其々の假定を全部包含して居ります。この計畫の共同旅行には一般の鑑察行動及びヒル覺書に提出された殘餘作業とが必須であります。

私は、こういう性質の基本的計畫を成立せしめるものとして之の
の假定は、まづ最善のものであると思ひます。勿論現在費下が予備行
動計畫を準備される場合はこの問題を實際的基礎に立つて展開してゆく
ために現在の艦隊の兵力と性質を必ず前提とすべきであらうと思ひま
すけれども。十三 五月二十二日 第十五号 八月二十

御齋願の無日の中に時を得られて、虹第二號に對する艦隊作戦計算突の準備を進められる事をお勧め致します。そして、私共は二問題に

私は、西海岸及びハワイには未だ十分に動員に應じ得る物資が在るものと了解して居りますが、貴下の真摯を得られれば仕合せであります。

西海岸地に於ける六、四七吋砲彈の予備補給員は目下満當であると思ひます。其處には六、〇〇〇個の砲彈が用意されてをり、且つ私が兵器廠に對し同量の火藥を繼續送するやうに求して解きました。

次に貴下が提議せられた大西洋分艦隊の或る司令官の問題に移ります。私共は近い將來に於て實行に移し度いと希望してあるものであります。それは同司令官を大西洋門逐分艦隊司令官に指定することであります。現在の計畫ではデネボラに裝備を附して神が官政旗艦として使用し得るやうにし、而して新しい一、五〇〇噸級逐艦の中の一を暫時令旗艦とし、追つて艦隊からサンブソン之が最も合理的な選擇と思はれます。又は別の一六五〇噸級逐艦をこの假指定された一、五〇〇噸級の新艦と交替すべく召喚するのであります。一五〇〇噸級は對空裝備を有してゐる故に一五〇〇噸級の方がサンブソンよりも貴下にとつて有利でありませうが同時にサブソンは艦隊司令部並に作戦部に必要な諸設備をするには、より充分な空間的余裕が

あるであらうと思ふのであります。私は新規にもう一つ別の巡洋艦を
 旗艦としようとは望んで居りません、今までさういふ事をやり過ぎて
 あたと私は新に考へるのであります。貴下からよりよき提の御提が
 無ければ、只今申上げた方法が本問題解決の最上策だと思はれます。
 巡洋艦配備に就いてはセントルキス及びヘレナを完成次第艦隊に編
 入すべきであると思ひます。そして艦隊訓練をしなければなりません
 この二艦は貴下にとつて大いに有用であります。我が海軍でこの二
 艦を大西洋から太平洋に移すことがあつても、私はそれを元へ戻さな
 ければなりません、現下の状態に在つては、現存巡洋艦勢力の削減を
 いづれかと云へば繼續強化しなければならぬのです。この件につい
 ては二つの解決法があります。即ちその一は、ロウクリフ及び第五巡
 洋艦隊を大西洋に置くことであります。
 之によつてハライ分遣艦隊に、重巡洋艦隊二つを又大西洋に二つを置
 くことになりませう。第二の方法はフレッチャイ艦隊、即ち第三巡洋艦
 隊、を大西洋に編入する事でありまして、之で大西洋には重巡洋艦隊一、

輕巡洋艦隊一が存することになります。之は太平洋に於ける貴下の輕巡洋艦隊一を減じ合計三つの重巡洋艦隊を持たれる事になるわけでありませう。勿論トレントンが歐洲から歸國次第私共はそれを修理させて、第三又第五は巡洋艦隊の何れかが大西洋に向けられた場合には之を太平洋又は大西洋の最も必用を感じる方面に於て任務に就けられませうにませう。

上記に關し貴下の腹藏無き御意見を電報にて御知らせ下さる様願上げます。(さうした方がよろしいと思はれるならば第四師で補足して下さい)

貴下は、此の秋に當つて太平洋の貴下の巡洋艦隊勢力削減といふ事はしりごみをなさるかもしれませんがこれは貴下にとつて當然のこと、思ひますし、私も貴下の立場にあれば御同様のことと思ひます。然し私が上述致しました如く狀勢が變化するに従ひ何れにか御決断が必用になると思ふのであります。事實この手紙が貴下に届く頃までには狀勢が變りその爲に艦隊の重厚なる一部を大西洋へ送り私の欲せざる所なるも斯く勢力を分掌しなければならなくなるかも知れないのであります。

セントルイスは七月十五日イフオークで完成し、ヘレナは七月九日にニューヨークで完成することになつてゐます。

南米諸國の或國に於ける状態は全く心配の種であります。で私は之を熟考の結果申上げるものであります。萬に一つ、ドイツが勝利を獲たならば———そうしたらどうなるでせうか？

貴下にお目にかゝり度く思ひますもし此處に於ける日本の意圖から少しでも逃れられる時が來たら———空を飛翔して逃ひに行かうと思ひます。

御健在でありますやうに。

敬具

ベテイナー

ハワイ眞珠灣、米艦「ペンシルヴァニア號」

米國艦隊司令長官

ジョージ・リチャードソン海軍大將殿

貴下にお目にかゝり度く思ひます。もし此處に於ける日本の意圖から少しでも逃れられる時が來たら———空を飛翔して逃ひに行かうと思ひます。

敬具

過去数日、文字通り議事堂、國務省及白聖館で暮しました。有難いことに昨日遂に兵十七萬及び海兵三萬四千の後援を獲得しました。未解決の問題はまだ澤山ある、しかし解決されて行くことを希つてゐます。

8

[illegible]

D. D. 1500-~~11~~

"COPY"

SECRET and
PERSONAL

COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
PEARL HARBOR, T.H.

20 June 1940

Dear Richardson:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 20 June, received by plane this morning; I note the contents thereof and will carry out your wishes expressed therein.

General Herron received a dispatch from the War Department the other day which stated in substance: "Alert your forces against hostile oversea raid. This must be done in such a way as to prevent newspaper publicity or notice of foreign intelligence agents. Department suggests that you do this on a maneuver basis in order to accomplish the above." General Herron brought this dispatch down to me and told me he was taking the necessary action and hoped that the Navy could see its way clear to have an off-shore patrol each day and do anything else in its power. I consulted Andrews and an off-shore and inshore patrol around Pearl Harbor has been arranged concerning which you have been advised by Calhoun. I have no idea of how long this situation will exist, nor as to the gravity thereof; for two days I had out the Fleet Marine Force and their anti-aircraft guns with ammunition. I called them in yesterday inasmuch as it was necessary to keep their ammunition under tarpaulins in the vicinity of the guns and this did not look like a very safe practice inasmuch as they were deployed in the heart of the navy yard. My idea is, if something more definite is not heard by Monday, I will probably put them out again on Monday and on a distant station somewhere near the Army guns.

I have many things of relative importance and unimportance to discuss with you. Everything goes along smoothly and busily. I took the liberty of telling Eddy that I thought he should go back with Rucker in the plane today without giving him any reasons.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ C. C. BLOCH.

Admiral J. O. Richardson, U.S.N.,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.

CCB;kt



辯護團側文書 一五〇〇六一二

抄 本

機密親展

ハワイ眞珠灣軍港第十四海軍區司令官

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）六月二十日

リチャードスン君

六月二十日附貴翰今朝航空便により受領致しました。書面の趣拜承、貴下の御希望は之が實現を致す所存です。

先にヘロン大將は陸軍省より大略次の如き電報を受けられた。即ち、
「貴下部隊は敵海上來襲に對し警戒されよ。而して本行動實施に當つては新聞報道乃至外國無線報機關の探知を防がねばならない。右目的達成の爲に本省は貴下が機動演習の形式に於て行動されん事を提言する」と。

ヘロン大將は此の電報を小生に示され大將が必要手段を執るつもりな
る事、更に海軍が毎日沿岸警備を確實に實施し又その權限内に於て、他
のあらゆる手段を執るやう望むものであると、語つた。小生はアンドリュ

D, D, 1500-G-2



ウスに語り、貴下に対してカルーンの忠告した如く、眞珠灣海附近に海岸
及沿岸警備隊を配置しました。

私は此の情勢がどの位續くか又その重大性に就ても全然予想がつきません
二日間私は海兵隊に對空砲を裝備して出動させましたが昨日中止させ各艦
の彈藥を砲側に防水罐をして置いておくやうに命じました。而も此の訓練
は軍港の中心部で行はれた爲極めて安全であるとは思はれませんでした。
私の考としては現在以上に確定的な知らせを月曜迄に受けなかつたら、恐
らく月曜日に海兵隊を陸軍砲臺附近の何處か遠隔の場所に出発を命じら
るゝつもりです。

貴下と協議致すべき重要及重要ならざる多くの問題があります。万事は圓
滑且多忙に進捗してゐます。失禮をも顧みずエツデイ氏に理由を申さず
にラツカーと共に飛行機にて歸らるべきである旨私の考を申上げました。

啓
具

0.0.ブロック

米國海軍大將
合衆國艦隊司令長官 旗 ベンシルベニア號坐乗

T.O.リチャードスン殿

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

(10) 20 August 1941, Subject: Chinese Resistance.
(Excerpt)

AUGUST 20, 1941

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Chinese Resistance.

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4. General Chu's visit undoubtedly indicates what we have had from other sources - that the Chinese here, and presumably also in Chungking, fear that they are being left out of the big picture, that we may not be firm in our present stand vis-a-vis Japan, and that aid to China may become more difficult in the future.

5. This Division believes that considerable morale aid might be given to China in the form of public statements emanating from high officials of the Government on our deep interest in Chinese resistance and our policy of aiding it. An official announcement of the forthcoming dispatch of a military mission to China is suggested. It is realized however that such morale aid would have to be considered in the light of its effect on the critical relations now existing between Japan and the United States.

/s/ Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES

Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copies to:

Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division

ONI
Mr. Currie
General Magruder

(Pages 1347 - 1348, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

辯護側文書第一五〇〇號 1 G 1 3

眞珠灣攻撃調査合同委員會 米國議會第七九回議會第一會期、
證據書類第三三號抄萃

證據書類第三三號

ワシントン陸軍省 G 1 2 作成、陸軍情報部判斷

(一〇) 一九四一年八月二〇日

主題、中國の抗戰

一九四一年八月二〇日

參謀總長への覺書

主題、中國の抗戰

四、朱將軍の訪問は確かに我々が他の出所から得た情報即ち當地の中國人、及び多分重慶の中國人も、自分達が此の大きな舞台から忘れられつつありはしないかといふこと、我々が日本と相對立してゐる現在の立場から動かないで居られないかも知れぬといふこと、そして對支援助が將來一屬困難となりはしないかといふことを危惧してゐる。こと



が確かであることを示すものである。

五、本部は、中國の抗戰に對する我々の深い關心及對支援助方針に關する政府高官に依る公けの聲明の形式に於て中國に對し可成りの精神的支援が與へられることを信ずる。近く中國に軍事使節を派遣する旨の正式發表が提案されてゐる。併し斯かる精神的支援は日米間に現在する破局的な關係に對する之が影響に徴して考慮されねばならなかつたであらうと認められる。

署名 シヤーマン、マイルス

シヤーマン、マイルス

G-12、參謀次長代理

米國陸軍代將

送付先

陸軍長官

陸軍次官

參謀總長

O N I

カリー氏

マツクルーダー大將

Def. Doc. # 1510-G 3

戰時計畫部（？）

（「珍珠灣攻擊」第十四卷第一三四七—一三四八頁）

Exhibit No. 39 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, First Session. (Excerpt)

EXHIBIT NO. 39

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for Record:

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 A.M., E.S.T., General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 P.M., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U.S. Army Forces in Far East; CG Caribbean Defense Command; CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

(Signed) L. T. Gerow
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

(Page 1409, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

護照側文書第一五〇〇一G一四

合衆國第七九議會第一會期、與珠灣攻擊調查共同委員會證據文書第三九號（拔萃）

證據文書第三九號

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月十五日

記録用覺書

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月七日、日曜日東部標準時間午前十一時三十分頃、マーシャル大將から役所に來るやうに呼ばれた。マイルズ大將ブラットン大佐出席。マーシャル大將は、駐米日本大使が一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月七日午後一時國務省に對し或る通牒を手交せよとの指令を受け、ある事實に言及したが、右通牒をこれこの時刻きつかりに手交せよといふ日本政府の指令は、極めて意味深長なものがありうるとマ大將は感じ、合衆國極東陸軍部隊、カリビヤ守備軍、ハワイ聯隊區第四軍等の夫々指揮官宛に即時送付さるべき警戒メッセーヂ案の走り筆を、マーシャル大將が讀み上げ、出席者一同これに賛同した。ブラットン大佐は同草案を通信本部に持

参し、最も迅速な方法で直ちに通信するやう命を受けた。数分するとブラッ
トン大佐は戻つて来て、メッセルデは通信本部に引續かれ約三十分経てば天
々行先に届くだらうとマーシャル大將に報告した。草案はこの後その日の中
にタイプに打たれ正式の誓願にされた。

参謀次長代理代將

(署名) L. T. デエロウ

「真珠灣攻撃」第十回巻、一四〇九頁

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: November 28, 1941

Subject:

Participants: Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister of the British Embassy
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,

Copies To:

Sir Ronald Campbell called on me at his request.

In the course of the conversation he stated that the British armed authorities have received a message from our armed authorities stating that in as much as the United States-Japan negotiations have "broken Down", it now becomes necessary to issue certain instructions to the armed forces; and that the British Government wishes to inquire of us whether the negotiations have "broken down". I said in reply that so far as I am aware neither the American Government nor the Japanese Government has declared or indicated that the negotiations are terminated, but that I was not in a position to confirm or deny statements attributed to any American official agency that the negotiations have "broken down". I called attention to statements attributed in the press to Mr. Kurusu and I mentioned a story brought me by one of the correspondents to the effect that in the course of the conversation when Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called on the President yesterday, the President had remarked that he hoped to see his callers again after his return from Warm Springs. (This story, I understand, is alleged to have emanated from the Japanese Embassy.)

S K H

EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF
THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK - CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES - PART 14.
PAGES 1186 - 1187

私ハ來栖氏大言トシテ新聞ニ掲載サレテキル記事ニ彼ノ注意ヲ引キマシタ
又野村大將ト來栖氏ガ昨且大統領ヲ訪問シタ時大統領ハ「ウオームスブリ
ング」カラ歸ツタ後又彼ヲ會イタイト云ツダト、或レ通信員ガ私ニ話シ
タコトモ、彼ニ話ツタヘゴノ話ハ、日本大使館カラ出タモノト信ジラレテ
キルトノコトダ

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米口々會

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會、審問ノ抜萃

第十四部 一一八六一一一八七頁

國務省

會談覺書

日時、一九四一年十一月二十八日

題目

參加者 英國大使館ヨリ公使ロナルド・キヤンベル卿

スタンリ・ケイ・ホーソベック博士

寫シ・送先

ロナルド・キヤンベル卿ハ會見ヲ申込ミ私ヲ訪問シタ

會談中ニ、彼ハ次ノ如ク述べタ。即チ英國軍部當局ハ我軍部當局ヨリ、
日米交渉ガ決裂シタ以上ハ軍隊ニ對シ然ルベキ命令ヲ發スルコトガ必要ト
ナツタトノ通達ヲ受取ツタガ、英國政府ハ、果シテソノ交渉ガ決裂シテシ
マツタノカドウカ確ニ知りタイト。

私ハソレニ答ヘ、私ノ知ル限りデハ米國政府モ日本政府モ交渉ガ終結シタ
ト公言シタコトモ暗示シタコトモナイガ、合衆國ノ何レカノ官廳ガ、交渉
ガ決裂シタト聲明シタトスレバ私ハコレヲ確證シタリ否認シタリスルコト
ノ出來ル地位ニ居ナイト述べタ。

D. D. 1500-H-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 May 1940.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CONFIDENTIAL

Lahaina Roads, T. H.
22 May 1940

Dear Betty:

As you no doubt well appreciate, I now must plan the Fleet schedule and employment for the next few months. To do this intelligently, however, it is necessary to know more than I know now (now) about why we are here and how long we will probably stay. I realize that the answer to the second question is largely dependent upon the first, and probably also upon further developments, but nonetheless I should have something to go on. For instance, carrying out even a curtailed gunnery schedule will require wholesale movements of targets, tugs, utility planes, etc., from the Coast. The following are pertinent questions:

- (a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our presence, and if so, what effect would the carrying out of normal training (insofar as we can under the limitations on anchorages, air fields, facilities and services) have on this purpose? The effect of the emergency docking program and the consequent absence of task forces during the training period must also be considered.
- (b) Are we here as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? If so, we should devote all of our time and energies to preparing for war. This could more effectively and expeditiously be accomplished by an immediate return to the West Coast, with "freezing" of personnel, filling up complements, docking and all the rest of it. We could return here upon completion.

As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here and at the same time is a diversification of effort and purpose that can only result in the accomplishment of neither.

If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime operating base, consideration should be given to the certain decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale that may ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, services, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet. If only peacetime training is involved should the Bureau of Navigation and I not be advised so we may remove restrictions on officer details?

The answer to your proposal to retain the ENTERPRISE at San Diego is dependent upon the answer to the above questions.

I am returning to Pearl Harbor with the Fleet on 24 May to remain until 10 June for upkeep. During the first week of this period, on the assumption that we are here for

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normal peacetime training, I will complete a survey of what is available and what are the minimum additional requirements in the way of:

Auxiliary air fields	Airplane services
Targets	Athletic fields and facilities
Tugs	Provisions
Utility planes	Fuel

Upon completion of this survey I may recommend a reduction in the number of carriers to be maintained in this area and I will probably request the allocation of funds for immediate work on auxiliary air fields and athletic fields and facilities.

Based on this survey and additional information from you, I may modify my orders regarding the shifting of tugs, tenders, targets, and utility planes from San Diego to Pearl Harbor.

At present the following are under orders to proceed to Pearl Harbor leaving the West Coast in June (except UTAH, BOGGS, and LAMBERTON, which are to come upon completion of overhaul in July or August):

- (a) Entire utility wing, including drone squadron, less Atron units and less minimum base units for continued overhaul, and for acceptance of new units (chiefly new drones). This amounts to approximately 40 planes and 300 personnel. The sufficiency of present facilities for repair and operation of these is questionable. However, without practically all the utility wing present in this area it is certain that the gunnery schedule of the Fleet will be seriously curtailed.
- (b) Three battle towing targets and four series 60 high speed sleds, and a number of series 40 high speed sleds, are to be towed or carried to the Hawaiian area by Base Force tugs and other Base Force vessels noted in (c) and (d).
- (c) MEDUSA, MELVILLE, WHITNEY, DORSEY, ELLIOT, and UTAH, BOGGS, and LAMBERTON, on completion of overhaul.
- (d) One oil barge and one garbage lighter, and five tugs.

If the Fleet is to remain here and carry out normal peacetime training it will be conducive to efficiency of administration, to the carrying out of employment schedules and to the most effective use of services and operating areas if the ships and services of the Hawaiian Detachment are incorporated under their normal type commanders. Unless advised

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to the contrary by you before 30 May, this will be done.

In any event and whatever the future holds, we seriously need additional enlisted personnel. We should no longer be content to operate with any vacancies in peacetime allowance materially below our needs and our complement. With so many ships building and other ships to be recommissioned, we must have many additional trained men. It will take a long time to train them. I urge that all training stations be operated to full capacity. Trained men are fully as important as additional material and equipment.

If we are in the preliminary stage of preparation for belligerent action our ships should be fully manned by the most competent available officer personnel. Peacetime shifting of officer personnel should cease. With my lack of knowledge of the Department's purposes and intentions, I feel that we may work at cross purposes, and the whole matter of officer personnel changes may become most confused.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

辯護國文第一五〇〇一號

ジェーオー。リチャードソン提督 發 エイダ。アール。スターク提督宛奉翰
一九四〇年五月二十二日附

合衆國艦旗ベンシルヴェニア號にて

ハワイ領ラハイナローヅにて

一九四〇年五月二十二日附

極 秘
拜 啓

貴下御承知の通目下の處小職は今後二、三ヶ月間の艦隊行動日程の計畫を
纏ておぼたせません。然し之を立派に爲し遂げる爲には、何故我々は當
地に居るのか、何時まで滞在するのかに就いて（現在）知つて居ない事を
もつと多く知る事が必要であります。此第二の點に就いての答は第一の
點に對する答が如何であるかによることが多く、又悉らくは今後の情勢の
展開如何によるものであると感知します。然しそれにしても矢張り何か根
拠となるものが無くてはなりません。



一例を挙げますと小規模の砲術訓練計畫を實施するにしても標的艦、曳船、雜務用飛行機其他を西部海岸から大がかりに移動する必要があると云ふ。次の二點が痛切に感ぜられます。

a 我艦隊の當地滞在は之によつて他國の行動に影響を與へることを主として居るのか、若し然りとすれば平時訓練の實施は一碇泊地、飛行場施設、便宜に對する種々の制限を受けながら實施し得る程度に於ては此目的の上に如何なる効果を及ぼすであらうか。非常入渠計畫並に其結果として同訓練期間中機動部隊が無くなることの影響も亦考慮に入れて置かねばならない。

b 我艦隊の當地滞在は戦闘行動上の飛石據點としてあるか。若し然りとすれば全部の時間と精力とを戦争準備に傾注すべきである。此戦争準備は即時西海岸に引揚げて、人員凍結定員の補充、入渠其他一切の處置を執つて行ふ方が一層有效でもあり又便宜でもある。其完了後當地に歸れば宜しい。

状態が目下の如き場合に於ては、とを當地に於て同時に試みたり實施したりすることは努力と目的との錯綜を來し其結果どちらも目的を達成出來ない事になります。

若し我艦隊の當地滯泊が當地を平時に於ける行動基地として發展させる爲だとすれば、かゝる大艦隊にとつては適當でない。錯地、飛行場、設備、便宜、娛樂機關等に於いて生ずる若干の艦隊能率の減退並に之に伴ふ士氣の低下について考慮を要します。若し平時訓練だけを目的とするものならば、航務局並に小艦に對しその旨御内示あり士官に關する制限を撤廢し得る様にせられて然る可きではないでせうか。

エンタプライズ號をサン・ディエゴに留めて置くようにといふ貴下の御申出に對する回答は以上の二問に對する答の如何によつて左右せられます。小職は艦隊と共に五月二十四日眞珠灣に歸り補修の爲六月十日まで同地留泊の豫定であります。艦隊の當地留泊は通常の平時訓練の爲だといふ豫定の下に同期間の第一週中に

補助飛行場、標的艦、曳船、難務用飛行機航空施設、運動場並に其施設、食糧燃料

等に就いて其現狀並に最少限限の補給必要量の調査を完了する積りであります。此調査を完了した上で當水域に保有すべき航空母艦隊の削減を提議するかも知りませんが又多分補助飛行場及運動場並に施設の即時着工費の割當を要求するであります。

此調査並に今後貴下から供給さるべき情報に基いて曳船、補給船、標的艦及難務用飛行機をサン・ディエゴから眞珠灣に移動することに関する小職の命令を修正するかも知りません。

目下のところ来る六月に西太平洋から東洋海に移動するよう命令されて居るのは左の通りであります（七月又は八月修理完了の上當地へ回航決定のユター、ボグス及ラムバートンを除く）

A、ツローン（雄略）一隻を含む補給品飛行機全部、但しアトロン隊並に今後の修理及新編部隊の収容に必要なる最少限度の基地部隊を除く（主としてツローン（雄略）機）此の補給品飛行機は略々四〇機乗員三〇〇名に達す。現在の設備が之等の修理及運用上充分なりや否や疑問なり。然しながら當水城に居る補給品飛行機の殆ど全部が満はなければ補給品の補給訓練日程は甚だしい制限を受けることは確かである。

B、現按訓練用飛行機約三隻六〇×編成高速三隊四隊及四〇隻編成高速隊隊を基地部隊の曳船又はロムビに揚ぐる艦船によつてハワイ水域迄曳行又は運搬する事になつてゐる。

C、メツィサ、メルヴィル、ホイトニー、ドーシー、エリオットの各艦及び修理完了後ユター、ボグス及ラムバートンの各艦

D、給油船一隻、塵芥運搬船一隻、曳船五隻

若し我艦隊が引續き當地に滯泊し通常の平時訓練を実施すべきものとすれば、ハワイ艦隊の艦船と施設とを平時型の司令官の下に置いた方が戦務能率上も、要員使用表の實施にも、施設並に行動區域の最も能率的な使用にも役立つことが多いであります。

五月三十日までに貴下から格別のお話がない限り以上の通り實施する積であります。

いづれにしても、將來どうあらうとも、正規兵員の増員を切實に必要とします。我々はこれ以上實質上、我々の必要を満たすに足りない平時制當並に定員を補充しないまま、で行動することに甘んじて居るべきではありません。

非常に多くの艦船が建造中であり又再服役することになつて居るので我々は多くの訓練された兵員の増加を要します。之を訓練するには長い時間がかかります。

小職は全訓練所が全能力を擧げて運用せらるべきことを主張します。訓練された兵員は資材、設備の追加と全く同様に重要であります。

若し戦艦準備の予備期に在るものとすれば我艦隊の艦船には都合し得る限り最優秀な士官を充分に配置すべきであります。平時並の士官異動は停止すべきであります。小艦は海軍本省の目的と意圖とを知らないで我々の仕事が目的と喰違も、士官異動全部が甚だ混雜を招くかも知れないと感じて居ります。

敬 具

ジェー。オー。チマードソン

コロンビヤ地區ワシントン市

海軍省海軍作戦部長

スターク海軍大將閣下